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My three colleagues' highly welcome, spirited responses to "Early American 
Studies Now: A Polemic from Literary Studies" come with two surprises: first, 
they are more generous than I thought they would be; second, the most incisive 
critique is staged by the scholar from whom I expected least opposition. Let me 
begin by reporting on my second surprise. At least in part, I saw my own return to 
aesthetics-and thus to questions of artistic forms and their social functions-as a 
way of responding to Ed White and Michael Drexler's call for "reading practices 
attentive to the work's formal and generic elements, as counter to the tendency 
to read thematically." Like Edgar Allan Poe's Dupin, whom White and Drex-
ler enlist for their cause in "The Theory Gap," my return to aesthetics aims at 
"sustain[ing] the gap between text and context" (482). Upon re-reading their es-
say, though, I realize that my own project is quite different from theirs: while they 
call upon fellow literary scholars to make their professional reading skills useful 
for more refined political readings of early American texts that would allow liter-
ary criticism of the period to emancipate itself from its current status as "a tex-
tual subfield of history" (472), I am primarily interested in exploring these texts' 
self-reflexive interrogation of the status of art vis-a-vis other social realms. To my 
mind, the question of how literary works, sculptures, and paintings negotiate and 
intervene in sociopolitical debates of their time cannot be divorced from a more 
general inquiry into the positionality of art in that time. Thus, the gap I wish to 
open up between text and context is not unbridgeable but wider than that envis-
aged by White and Drexler. 
This might help explain why, for me, White's response to my polemic remains 
squarely within the political readings of aesthetic theory that I take issue with. In 
its determination to "ma[p] the constituent political dimensions of nascent aes-
thetic formulations," it subjects aesthetic writings to the hermeneutics of suspi-
cion. My unease with this take on aesthetics does not derive from a belief that 
aesthetic thinking is in any way politically neutral or that "historicist objectivity" 
is an attainable or even desirable goal. My unease derives from the conviction 
that reflections on art and sensuous perception are interesting in their own right 
and should be understood and appreciated as such before being correlated with 
history and politics. To my mind, 'symptomatic' readings of aesthetic theories do 
not suffice. Yes, the "distinction between 'Art' and the artisanal" is indeed "arbi-
trary," at least in a Saussurean sense, but the arbitrariness of that distinction says 
little about either its heuristic potential or its real-world effects. 
Furthermore, while I am not entirely sure that my essay "enact[s] the fantasy 
of an aesthetic object fundamentally distinctive from other 'things,"' I do believe 
in the enabling and emancipatory power of that fantasy. Schiller's letters On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man are indeed apposite here for they stage a powerful 
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argument that aesthetic experience has an emancipatory political force precisely 
because it is one step removed from empirical reality. One and a half centuries be-
fore the Frankfurt School, Schiller invites us to ponder Adorno's paradox that "[a] 
sociality becomes the social legitimation of art" (234). Schiller's guiding question 
at the close of the eighteenth century was how the emancipatory potential of the 
Enlightenment project could be salvaged given that its most powerful social and 
political actualization, the French Revolution, had descended into terreur by the 
time Schiller was writing his letters. Schiller's answer was basically this: if the En-
lightenment project is to succeed, it must speak not only to human beings' reason 
but their feelings, too. And aesthetic experience is the space of play where reason 
and feeling (the 'form-drive' and the 'sensuous drive' in Schiller's anthropology) 
are reconciled so that subjects are liberated from the constraints of each. Thus, 
Schiller's reflections on aesthetic education provide a corrective to Robespierre's 
grim determination to erect an "empire of reason," an "order of things where all 
the low and cruel passions are enchained, all the beneficent and generous pas-
sions awakened by the laws" (3). This is why Schiller writes, in a quote adduced 
by White, that "Beauty alone can confer on him a social character" (215). Schiller 
starts from the individual and ends with the collective: an emancipated sociality 
depends on individuals emancipated in the course of aesthetic education. This 
is at the heart of the most often quoted phrase from Schiller's letters: "it is only 
through Beauty that man makes his way to Freedom" (9). 
Still, White's comments on the class-bias and political import of Schiller's aes-
thetic theory are perfectly accurate and justified (as are, a fortiori, his analogous 
comments on Uvedale Price's theorization of the picturesque). At the same time, 
they do not engage with what seems to me central to Schiller's argument: the 
emancipatory potential of autonomous art and aesthetic semblance. And speak-
ing of 'aesthetic semblance': White rightly points out that the passage I quote 
from Schiller concerning the liberating potential of aesthetic semblance is pre-
ceded by a distinction between "extreme stupidity and extreme intelligence" 
(193). To my mind, though, the passage that follows my quote is more apposite. 
There, Schiller makes a strict distinction between 'logical semblance' and 'aes-
thetic semblance,' declaring the former inadmissible while defending the lat-
ter. This distinction, which Schiller develops with the autonomy of art in sight, 
is crucial when it comes to analyzing the kinds of deceptions that White points 
out in Brown's Ormond: "Dudley's misreading of Ormond, his misreading of the 
yellow fever, his blindness, Baxter's dream, Constantia's miniatures, and so on." 
As is well known, deceptions of all kinds abound in Brown's gothic novels, from 
Wieland to Ormond and Arthur Mervyn. And of course, political critiCism has 
often read them as anxious responses to the rise to prominence of self-interested 
individuals in the emerging liberal paradigm. Yet a careful consideration of Schil-
ler's defense of aesthetic semblance also allows us to see that deception in Brown 
is not always marked negatively. While Carwin's multiple deceptions may indeed 
precipitate the Wieland family's downfall, deception and delusion in Wieland 
are also sources of artistic creativity. This is why Clara Wieland does not care 
"[w]hether," in sketching Carwin's face, her "hand was aided by any peculiar 
inspiration, or [she] was deceived by [her] own fond conceptions" (61), and this 
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is what allows the ever-ambivalent Carwin to identify himself as an artist figure 
when he claims that his deeds "self-expelled" him "from a scene which the munifi-
cence of nature had adorned with unrivalled beauties, and from haunts in which 
all the muses and humanities had taken refuge" (241). Such passages add a deci-
sively self-reflexive dimension to Brown's novel in that they stage an interrogation 
of the power of make-believe that is central to the art of fiction. To conclude my 
response to White, let me add that I am all in favor of his proposal of a 'negative 
genealogy': studying those aesthetic forms and practices that did not travel across 
the Atlantic may turn out to be as fruitful as studying those that did, be it from 
the perspective of his hermeneutics of suspicion or the newly configured aesthet-
ics that I advocate. 
Let me turn to my first surprise. I am grateful for Stephen Shapiro's charac-
terization of my polemic as a "conversation-enabling intervention" and hope that 
my brief response to his response will be received in the same gracious spirit. Let 
me start out by noting that Shapiro is entirely right to point out that my critique of 
currently dominant approaches within Early American Studies is restricted to the 
field itself and does not sufficiently take into account that, partly due to scholars' 
(most often critical) engagement with U.S. foundational myths, the field "remains 
more tightly policed by extra-academic forces than almost any other sphere of 
American Studies" even as its findings have not yet reached a wide enough audi-
ence beyond academia. For a European Americanist such as myself, it is all too 
easy to forget the extent to which what I call 'the politicization of literary and 
cultural studies' is a response to the political instrumentalization of the nation's 
past (as well as its present) by reactionary forces outside the academia. Speaking 
from where I speak, I am highly unlike to receive, as did a U.S. colleague of mine, 
death threats for publicly denouncing the reiteration of the Vietnam-era slogan 
'support our troops' during the 1990/91 edition of the Persian Gulf War. But what 
conclusions should we draw from our awareness of the historical and cultural situ-
atedness of past and present discourses about the nation? Should we acknowl-
edge, as Shapiro does, that talk about "aesthetics" and the "play of the text" may 
jar in the ears of graduate students socialized in a new era of austerity? And if so, 
should we revamp, as Shapiro suggests, questions concerning aesthetics in terms 
of (collective) emotions and "structures of feeling" and their socially transforma-
tive potential? Perhaps we should. But before we go down that road, we should 
also remind our students that play is a decidedly serious affair for both Schiller 
and Derrida. When, in 1795, Schiller wrote that "to mince matters no longer, man 
only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only 
fully a human being when he plays" (107), he did so because he considered play 
and aesthetic experience privileged paths toward the emancipation of subjects 
that the Enlightenment promised but appeared to withhold as it was descending 
into state-sponsored bloodshed during the final stages of the French Revolution. 
In a different but related vein, while the connection between play and freedom 
is more implicit in Derrida's language philosophy, it is useful to remind oneself 
once more that it has proven crucial for explicitly political reworkings of decon-
struction in post-colonial and feminist challenges to dominant discourses. Finally, 
while I would not replace 'aesthetics' with 'emotions,' I wholeheartedly welcome 
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revisiting Raymond Williams and the Birmingham School, adding merely that 
'feeling' and 'emotion' are also key aesthetic terms. After all, aesthetics is, we 
have learned from Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, the theory of aisthesis, i.e., 
of sense perception, sensation, and feeling. Shapiro is entirely right in dismissing 
any facile distinction between literature and history; let us also apply that to that 
other distinction: aesthetics and politics. 
Out of my esteemed trio of respondents, it is Duncan Faherty who most explic-
itly characterizes my contribution as "provocative." He rightly takes me to task for 
overemphasizing the success of canon-revision over the last quarter of a century 
or so. There are, I readily admit, countless texts waiting to be recovered, some of 
which may fundamentally change our view of what constitutes early American 
literature. So why stray once more across the Atlantic to engage with European 
cultural elites' reflections on art and sensuous cognition that were not even read 
in the early republic? Why pursue such "ethereal connections" and "imaginary 
avenues" when many far more tangible local and hemispheric connections of cul-
tural production, circulation, and exchange remain unexplored? In answering 
this question, let me return to one of the avenues for further exploration that I 
sketch in "What Now?" -the final section of my essay. In my understanding, eigh-
teenth- and early nineteenth-century American'artistic production and European 
reflections on art are connected not so much through a transatlantic exchange of 
texts or human beings, but through a trans-atlantically shared modernity. What 
I have in mind here is a very specific understanding of processes of moderniza-
tion that is broadly accepted in German-speaking academia and is only gradu-
ally being introduced into anglophone scholarship. I am talking about systems 
theory as laid out in Niklas Luhmann's Social Systems, Art as a Social System, and 
his opus magnum Theory of Society, the first part of which has just appeared in 
English translation with Stanford University Press. Luhmannian systems theory 
conceives of modernity as a process of functional differentiation in the course of 
which Western societies differentiate into self-organizing yet interacting social 
systems such as religion, politics, and art that each function according to their own 
logic and perform a unique function for society as a whole. Such an understanding 
of modernity helps us see that the autonomization of art from religion, morality, 
politics, and science, which was well underway in the eighteenth century but only 
reached its first apex in romanticism, is not an isolated phenomenon at all but the 
manifestation of a much more general process of functional differentiation in one 
social system, the system of art. What it also helps us see, and this is more crucial 
to the argument I develop in my essay "Book and Wax: Two Early American Me-
dia of Deception" and my book manuscript "Beautiful Deceptions: American Art 
and European Aesthetics, 1750-1828," is that American art (novels, sculptures, 
paintings) of the early republic and contemporaneous European reflections on 
art and sensuous cognition share a keen awareness that the position of art within 
society is fundamentally changing in the process of functional differentiation, that 
it is moving toward autonomy, a position from which it "radicalizes the difference 
between the real and the merely possible in order to show through works of its 
own that even in the realm of possibility there is order after all. Art opposes, to 
use a Hegelian formulation, 'the prose of the world,' but for precisely this reason 
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it needs this contrast" (Luhmann, Art 146). I cannot outline my argument con-
cerning art's self-reflexive awareness of its autonomy in detail in the space of this 
text. Suffice it to say that it manifests itself as much in American artists' however 
cautious assertions of the right to fiction (Brackenridge, Tyler, Tenney, Patience 
Wright, Charles Willson and Raphaelle Peale), their self-reflexive interrogation 
of the kinds of knowledge art can impart (Brown, the Peales), and their probing 
of the fallibility of characters' sense perceptions (Brown, Rowson, Tenney) as it 
does in European aestheticians' reflections on sensuous cognition (Baumgarten), 
disinterestedness in' the experience of beauty (Kant), the autonomy of judgments 
of taste (Burke, Hume, Kant), and aesthetic semblance (Schiller). Now I am fully 
aware that to adopt a systems-theoretic macroperspective is by no means uncon-
troversial given that we have (rightly) become wary of historical master narra-
tives, and I am equally aware that my plea for a return or (as White has it) a turn 
to aesthetics, let alone autonomy aesthetics, will at first strike many in the field 
as ahistorical and apolitical. And yet there is a rich tradition of modern thinking 
about art-from Schiller to Adorno and beyond-that locates the political force 
of art precisely in its autonomy, in the gap or distance between art and empirical 
reality without which art's potential for negativity and crucial critique would al-
ways already be neutralized. It is ultimately from within this tradition that I write, 
well aware of its low currency in U.S. literary-critical circles today. This is why 
I am especially grateful not only to have this transatlantic exchange with three 
generous and inspiring American scholars but also to be given the opportunity to 
respond to the respondents. 
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